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Th e provision of human services, including paid care, relies substan-
tially on government funding. Increasingly over the last 25 years, 
in Australia and elsewhere, that funding has been distributed using 
‘competitive’ market mechanisms. Th e result has been a widespread 
development of managed markets, also known as ‘quasi-markets’, 
in human services. Th ere are many variants of managed markets, 
but they are all distinguished from conventional markets1 primarily 
by the fact that government is the source of much, if not all, of the 
purchasing power of the users of services. Th is enables government 
to dictate how these markets operate in ways that go well beyond 
the powers of government in most conventional markets. In turn, 
government action in shaping the particular form of each managed 
market will substantially infl uence the types of service provider or-
ganisations that operate in that market, including the extent to which 
for-profi t organisations (FPOs) are present. 
Th is chapter reviews some key characteristics of human services, 
managed markets, and FPOs, as a basis for examining the type of 
service providers that should and do operate in these markets, par-
ticularly in terms of the growing role of FPOs. Th is analysis can 
assist in establishing whether there may be justifi cation for limiting 
or encouraging the participation of some types of providers in these 
1 We use the term ‘conventional markets’ to refer to markets where there is no or 
minimal government funds to purchase the product; that is, the type of market 
assumed in standard economic theory. 
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markets—and if so, under what circumstances and on what terms. 
Th ere are, of course, more fundamental concerns about the valid-
ity of marketising human services, but the chapter assumes that, in 
the foreseeable future, governments will continue to use managed 
markets to support the provision of these services. Th us the focus is 
on how these markets work and how they might be made to work to 
maximise the achievement of social objectives, rather than examin-
ing the broader concerns. 
Th e chapter draws on developments from a range of services and 
market types. Its fi ndings should be regarded as an attempt to identify 
general trends and issues that then need to be tested in sector-specif-
ic or cross-sector studies, rather than as a claim to lay down a theory 
or prescription that fi ts all situations. Two key points emerge from 
the chapter. First is the importance of ensuring that the initial entry 
of all service providers is closely monitored given the inherent ten-
sion between profi t maximisation and service quality, coupled with 
the lack of perfect information for service users and their agents in 
these markets. Second is the blurring of the boundaries between 
non-profi t organisations (NPOs) and FPOs in these markets, such 
that we need to go beyond this simple dichotomy to establish which 
types of organisation can best provide services in each situation.
Human services
Zins (2001, pp. 6–7) defi nes human services as ‘institutionalised 
systematic services’ aimed at ‘meeting human needs … required for 
maintaining or promoting the overall quality of life’ of service users. 
While this covers a diverse range of fi elds and programs, including 
education, health, child care, residential and at-home care for the 
aged, disability, family support, early intervention, homelessness, 
and job search assistance for the disadvantaged, most share common 
features that can make their provision via a ‘market’ somewhat 
problematic. Th at said, it is important not to overstate the distinct 
features of human services and to recognise that some of these 
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features have traditionally been ascribed to all services, including 
services provided through conventional markets. 
Economic analysts (for example, Productivity Commission 2002a; 
Miles & Boden 2000; Miles 1995; Bureau of Industry Economics 
1980; Akehurst & Gadrey 1987; Baumol 1967) have identifi ed that 
services are more likely to have the following core characteristics:
(i) Simultaneity of production and consumption, as shown, for 
example, in the way that the assistance given by a carer in 
bathing an aged person is ‘consumed’ at the same time it is 
‘produced’. 
(ii) Intangibility, in that ‘the output tends to disappear at the point 
of delivery, leaving no lasting physical manifestation’ (Saunders 
1999, p. 40).
(iii) Th e central importance of labour in production, so that, for 
example, the capacity of each individual carer largely determines 
the quality of care provided. 
(iv) Th e consumer as an active agent in determining the fi nal product, 
as shown by the way a teacher adapts a lesson to suit the 
individual students in a class. 
In turn, these factors mean that with services there is more likely to 
be: 
(v) Heterogeneity in a given ‘product’, such that there is variation both 
between diff erent suppliers and by a single supplier over time. 
For example each doctor’s consultation, carer’s act of bathing 
an aged person, and lesson by a teacher will be distinct in some 
way.
(vi) Limits to improving labour productivity, in that there is limited 
scope to reduce the amount of labour needed for a given level 
of output. 
(vii) Complexities with measurement of output, quality, and 
productivity. 
(viii) Asymmetry of information whereby one player or set of players 
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in a market, usually the suppliers, has more information about 
the production process and the fi nal product.
(ix) Buyer uncertainty about the product before purchase, given that 
there is likely to be nothing tangible to inspect before buying.
Early economists regarded labour used in services as ‘unproduc-
tive’ (Smith 1991, pp. 294–96), and thus the foundations of modern 
micro-economics were largely developed on the basis of the produc-
tion and distribution of goods, and in denial of the characteristics 
and economic value of services based on labour (Tucker 1977, pp. 
13–16; Channon 1978, p. 1). Hence, the gap between the standard 
core assumptions of micro-economic theory, such as homogenous 
products and full information for all buyers and sellers, and the 
complexity of economic reality is even more pronounced in rela-
tion to services.2 While developments in computerised technology 
and integrated systems over the last 25 years have transformed some 
service industries, including communications and retail (Triplett 
& Bosworth 2003), the distinct characteristics set out above all re-
main very relevant—and accentuated—in human services where 
the ‘product’ being supplied is largely dependent on the quality of 
the human interaction. Nowhere is this clearer than in the care sec-
tors, and England and Folbre (2003), Fine (2007), and Himmelweit 
(2007) provide an insight into the special features of caring and paid 
care that illustrate a number of the points made in this section. 
We now consider what factors distinguish human services from other 
services, especially in terms of why greater government intervention 
is necessary. First, because human services aim to meet basic devel-
2 Of course, subsequent developments in mainstream economics (from Coase 
(1937) onwards) have recognised these issues. However, the use of the term ‘cost 
disease’ to describe Baumol’s argument that the inherent nature of services limits 
productivity improvements illustrates a common view among economists that 
labour-intensive services are aberrant problems rather than simply diff erent forms 
of economic activity. It must be noted, however, that Baumol himself actually 
said that many of these services are ones ‘that do so much to enrich our existence’ 
(Baumol 1967, p. 422). 
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opment and care needs of people, there are strong moral and public 
policy imperatives to ensure at least some minimum level of service 
for everyone and to avoid poor service to anyone. A wide range of 
quality from Armani to Target may be acceptable in consumer items, 
but not in human services. Second, the eff ective delivery of human 
services is more likely to require an extended set of individual ser-
vice transactions over time. Th is has major cost implications for each 
user, while also making it more diffi  cult to assess the quality and 
outcomes of a service, especially in the shorter term. Th ird, on the 
demand side, the end users of human services generally have vul-
nerability or limited capacity in some respect and thus agents who 
make decisions on behalf of users are an important feature of hu-
man services. Agents may be family members, personal associates, 
government agencies, or paid brokers. For example, parents make 
decisions about child care for their children, and adult children may 
make decisions about aged care for their parents. Importantly, how-
ever, agents are rarely able to observe the service being provided. 
Fourth, many of the end users of human services, and their family 
agents, have limited, if any, funds to buy the services they need.
Having identifi ed core diff erences between services and goods, and 
then between human services and other services, our next step is to 
identify the main sources of diff erence between various types of hu-
man services. Propper (1993, p. 40), writing about health and social 
care services, noted that those services diff er in ‘the technology of 
production, the nature of demand, and the information of actors in 
these industries’, and this observation can be applied more gener-
ally across all human services. Th us, for example, residential aged 
care diff ers from at-home community care for the aged because it 
requires substantially more capital and buildings, because it has to 
provide service for longer periods each day and for less able users, 
and because buyers of residential care are less likely to have informa-
tion about the full production process.
Th e above analysis has implications for the way in which human 
services are provided and the organisations—and types of organi-
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sations—that become service providers in each market. First, given 
that many services are largely unobserved by buyers—who are buy-
ing on behalf of others—and the quality and outcomes are diffi  cult 
to measure, there is much potential for opportunistic behaviour 
both through adverse selection and moral hazard.3 Hence there is a 
greater need for trust between the buyer (service user or agent) and 
seller (service provider), with the motivation, values and commit-
ment to client needs of the provider being critically important.
Second, to the extent that trust is lacking, there will be transaction 
costs for all parties, both ex ante (prior to approval of a provider) and 
ex post (monitoring and assessing the services)—and these costs can 
be large. Indeed, Williamson (1975; 1998; 2000), a seminal writer in 
the fi eld of contracting, points out that the limits on an individual’s 
capacity to gather and process all relevant information, which econ-
omists called ‘bounded rationality’, make it impossible to specify all 
the contingencies that may arise in the future, and hence ‘all complex 
contracts are unavoidably incomplete’ (Williamson 2000, p. 599). 
Th ird, because people are central to the production and delivery of 
human services, a provider is limited in the extent to which it can 
genuinely increase measured productivity (Baumol 1967; Himmel-
weit 2007). Th e quality of a service is critically dependent on the 
personal and professional skills of staff  and the relationships they 
develop with users, and thus signifi cantly reducing the number or 
quality of staff  or the time they spend with clients can fundamentally 
alter the nature of the service that is provided. Larger organisations 
have been able to eff ect economies of scale and scope in human 
services, but these oft en arise from strategies in management, mar-
keting, and ‘back-offi  ce’ functions rather than enhancing the direct 
production of the service. 
Fourth, there are limits to standardisation of a service, since too 
3 Adverse selection is where the buyer makes a wrong choice because the provider 
does not reveal everything about itself. Moral hazard is where the provider puts in 
less resources and produces lower quality products than has been agreed.
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close a specifi cation of processes and outputs may reduce the quality 
of service for each user by ignoring his/her individuality. Fift h, it is 
likely that the ‘provider profi le’, that is, the mix of diff erent types of 
provider organisations, will vary between diff erent human services.
An important implication of the above analysis is the inherent ten-
sion between commercial imperatives and the quality of human 
services, especially in relation to staff . A common lesson from stud-
ies of specifi c human services is that the major drivers of quality are 
lower user-staff  ratios (variously described as case load, class size, et 
cetera), higher staff  qualifi cations, an overall staff  profi le that has a 
high proportion of people who have signifi cant qualifi cations and 
experience, and adequate remuneration to ensure the attraction and 
retention of good staff . However, these are precisely the major cost 
drivers for human service providers, for whom staff  can represent 
over 80 per cent of total costs in some sectors. Th us there will be 
continuing pressure to control these staff  costs (Wade 2007). FPOs 
will rightly argue that they will lose ‘customers’ or their contract if 
quality is perceived to fall, but a fi ne balance between limiting costs 
and an acceptable level of quality can be maintained, especially 
where information to customers can be restricted and marketing 
techniques used to shape customer expectations (Press & Woodrow 
2005, pp. 282–83). Th is does not mean that there is no role for FPOs 
and the profi t motive, but it does suggest that profi t maximisation 
does not sit easily with ensuring high quality services. 
Managed markets
Managed markets are distinguished from most other forms of 
public funding because they require external bodies that provide 
direct services for the public to directly compete against each other 
to obtain the funds. Managed markets are distinguished from 
conventional markets primarily because government provides much 
of the purchasing power for users. 
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From an economic perspective, government involvement is necessary 
in human services because of the prevalence of market failure—the 
‘provision by a competitive market of an output quantity which is not 
socially optimal’ (Maddala & Miller 1989, p. 619)—or, more precisely 
in some cases, because no market has formed given the limited 
fi nances of the people who need the services. It is thus somewhat 
ironic that market mechanisms are now being used to fund services 
in sectors where historically the market has not worked. 
Th e concept of contestability is central to the establishment and 
operation of managed markets. Formally, contestability is about the 
ease of entry into and exit from a market. In a perfectly contestable 
market, entry and exit are ‘costless’, in the sense that there are no 
additional costs for new entrants or ‘departees’ above the normal 
costs of establishing and operating the enterprise (Baumol 1982; 
Baumol et al. 1982). Th e core premise of contestability is that by 
making service providers subject to merely the threat of competition 
(and thus to the threat of loss of revenue), the overall quality and 
effi  ciency of all providers will be improved, both by attracting new 
providers and by driving improved performance by incumbents. 
Whether this logic is valid for managed markets in human services 
and whether it varies by the type of service, the form of the market 
or the type of provider are empirical questions to be answered in 
each situation. 
Managed markets as a means of distributing government funds are 
not unique to human services nor are they a recent innovation (for 
example, tendering for public infrastructure has long been used). 
Further, governments can and do shape all markets, through policy 
statements, through general laws on corporations, competition, 
taxation and fair trading, and through the regulation of specifi c 
industries. However, because it provides a high proportion of the 
‘consumer purchasing power’ in managed markets, government has 
greater power to shape these markets. 
Bartlett and Le Grand (1993, pp. 13–19) identify the core objectives 
that governments have in establishing managed markets in social 
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policy, namely to promote greater eff ectiveness, effi  ciency, choice, 
responsiveness to client needs, and equity.4 Th ere will be trade-off s 
in achieving these objectives; for example, increasing choice can 
mean a loss of effi  ciency. Bartlett and Le Grand (1993, pp. 19–34) 
also identify fi ve key prerequisites of managed markets if these 
objectives are to be achieved: some level of competition between 
providers; appropriate motivations and incentives for both buyer 
(whose focus should be the welfare of the users) and provider (who 
should in part be motivated by fi nancial considerations so that they 
respond to market signals); symmetry in the information available 
to buyers and providers; minimal transaction costs; and avoidance 
of ‘creaming’.5 
In a managed market, government can substantially dictate the way 
that the market functions, by making decisions about key features of 
the four core elements of a market: 
(i)   Product: What is the service to be funded? What aspects of the 
service will be funded? 
(ii)  Buyer (users or agents): Who is eligible to use the subsidised 
product? How much is the subsidy? Do some users get a higher 
subsidy than others? Is any additional payment by the buyer 
required or possible? Can the subsidy cover all costs or is an 
additional co-payment by the buyer required or possible? Are 
there limits on the total dollars (or places) available to the whole 
population? 
(iii) Sellers, or service providers: Who can sell to those buyers sup-
ported by government funds? On what basis do they have to 
operate? What, if any, minimum standards are mandated for 
4 Bartlett and Le Grand (1993) only list four objectives, confl ating eff ectiveness and 
effi  ciency into effi  ciency. 
5 ‘Creaming’ involves limiting services to ‘less diffi  cult’ clients rather than assisting 
those with more complex needs who require more resources and represent a greater 
operational risk. Th e term ‘residualisation’ is also used to describe this process 
(Press & Woodrow 2005, p. 284). 
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providers to enable entry to the market? What mechanism de-
termines who can service clients: tender or licensing? How oft en 
is the market ‘opened’ to new providers and is it open periodi-
cally or continuously? Is the right to operate tradeable? What 
performance targets and requirements are in place, and how are 
performance standards monitored and enforced?
(iv) Means of exchange: How do buyers and sellers interact? How do 
providers obtain individual clients? What is the basis of pay-
ment of the government funds: inputs, outputs, or outcomes, 
and how are these measured? Are payments made to provid-
ers or to users? What method of payment does the government 
use? 
In an unregulated conventional market, most of these factors are 
irrelevant or not directly the business of government, with buyers 
and sellers subject only to general laws. Even in a regulated conven-
tional market, government action in any single market will usually 
be limited to only some aspects of the four elements. In a managed 
market, however, government may have at least fi ve distinct roles: 
policy-maker, regulator, banker, direct buyer, and service provider. 
Diff erent agencies or even jurisdictions may take on each of these 
fi ve roles in a specifi c market, but it is not uncommon for all roles to 
be administered from within the same agency.
Forms of managed markets
Th ere are many potential variants of managed markets, each emerging 
as the outcome of government decisions on the factors listed above 
in specifi c cases. Governments, however, do not necessarily make 
explicit decisions about all of these factors. Indeed, in some cases, 
the ad hoc and implicit nature of some ‘decisions’ can mean that 
some elements of a program are inconsistent with other elements, 
or even with the overall objectives of the program. Further, ‘In 
practice, the way a service is delivered … may be more a product of 
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political dogma than of an assessment of relative effi  ciency or equity’ 
(Burchardt 1997, p. 5).
Th ree major forms of managed markets using non-government 
providers, both FPO and NPO, can be identifi ed:
Competitive tendering and contracting (CTC)• : A government 
agency chooses who will be the service provider(s) for a 
designated group of users. 
Licence-subsidy (LS)• : Entry is possible for any provider who 
meets a set of minimum requirements and standards (licence). 
Licensed providers then ‘compete for customers’ with the 
government substantially meeting much, possibly all, the costs 
of service for approved users (subsidy). Subsidies may be paid 
either to users or providers. If paid to users, they may be paid by 
cash, ‘vouchers’, tax deductions or tax credits.
Hybrids of CTC and LS models• : A limited number of providers 
are chosen via a CTC process, and then these providers ‘compete 
for customers’, with various possible limitations placed on the 
buyer-seller interaction and/or the use of mechanisms that 
ensure a minimum level of activity for all providers. 
Th ere are two main advantages of using CTC instead of a LS system. 
First, CTC better facilitates the planning of limited resources to 
ensure coverage of all areas and groups, greater stability in the overall 
supply of services, and greater stability for individual providers 
(which in turn can promote more investment in resources to improve 
the quality of services). Second, CTC allows closer monitoring of the 
quality of services. Against this, CTC is a costly and time-consuming 
process for both government and providers, off ers little opportunity 
for users to select or have a choice of providers, and gives only 
limited signals from users as to which organisations provide the best 
service. Users generally have no exit option and very limited voice 
options to infl uence how a service operates (Hirschmann 1970). 
Th us LS is likely to be used where there is a desire to increase market 
signals, consumer sovereignty, choice, and provider responsiveness, 
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and to reduce administration costs. In practice, however, there 
is much variation in LS systems between service types, regions, 
and individual providers in the extent to which users can actually 
infl uence the form and operation of the service they receive (Press & 
Woodrow 2005, pp. 281–82). 
Hybrid systems have emerged in response to the disadvantages 
of CTC. Th ey aim to draw on the best aspects of both systems by 
limiting providers to the best ones, ensuring better planning of 
limited resources, and giving a greater guarantee of quality, while 
giving users some greater choice and generating market signals. Th e 
major disadvantage of the hybrids is that they retain the complexities 
and costs of the CTC process.
One argument for the introduction of managed markets has been 
that they will give users more information and make the allocation 
of public funding more transparent. But in practice, under all three 
forms, the notion of ‘commercial-in-confi dence’ has oft en been used 
to restrict the information available to users.
For both the users and providers of services, LS markets operate 
more like a conventional market, although governments still make 
most of the critical decisions about the features of a market listed 
above. Th ere is no clear-cut boundary between a LS managed mar-
ket and a conventional market, but even where a high proportion of 
the providers’ revenue comes from user contributions, government 
licensing and funding can still drive the involvement and operation 
of major providers in the market.6 LS systems are also referred to 
as ‘quasi-vouchers’ (Lyons 2001, p. 186), ‘demand-side subsidies’, or 
‘consumer-directed payments’, but it is important to use a term that 
also acknowledges the critical supply-side licensing element, which 
limits the organisations to which service users can present their ‘sub-
sidies’ and requires providers to comply with regulations that are 
continuously monitored and enforced.
6 For example, the corporate FPO, ABC Learning Centres, stated that a key 
element of its ‘successful child care model’ is to ‘maximise government funding [to] 
underwrite income sources’ (ABC Learning Centres 2005). 
  For-profit organisations in managed markets   •  55
Under a LS system, any organisation that meets the minimum 
licensing requirements can provide services that attract government 
funds, whereas under CTC an organisation may meet the minimum 
service standards required of all tenderers, but still not be able to 
service approved users if it is not selected in the tender process. 
Under CTC, the competition between providers is to gain entry to 
the market and the user typically has no direct say about who the 
providers will be. Under LS, the competition between providers is to 
attract consumers. In other words, under CTC providers compete for 
markets, while under LS they compete within markets. Both forms 
of competition exist under hybrid systems. Under both CTC and 
hybrids, generally no new provider can enter in the shorter term 
to respond to emerging client needs. Two observed eff ects in some 
CTC markets (for example, the Job Network)7 are that aft er an infl ux 
of new providers with the initial introduction of contestability, the 
market becomes more closed over time with fewer providers and the 
larger ones increasingly dominant. 
Th e type of managed market used has no necessary connection, 
theoretically or empirically, with the type of service. A given service 
may be supported by any of the managed market variants, depend-
ing on the jurisdiction. For example, the use of various LS systems to 
support ‘consumer-directed’ at-home personal care for aged people 
has been widespread in western nations for some years (Evers et al. 
1994; Keigher 1999; Ungerson & Yeandle 2007), but this approach 
has had limited use in Australia where CTC continues to be pri-
marily used. On the other hand, LS systems have been supported by 
proponents of markets in Australia for the last quarter of a century 
and are used for child care and residential aged care, while there is 
currently strong support from some users for voucher-type systems 
for disability programs (Hughes 2006). Th e Productivity Commis-
sion (2002b, pp. 11.1–11.6) has also argued for the introduction of 
7 Th is national program was established in 1998 to replace a service system formerly 
provided by the government’s Commonwealth Employment Service (CES).
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a licence system for the Job Network; in response, van Dyke (2002) 
argues that this would lead to wasted resources in marketing and 
more providers than are needed or effi  cient. 
In practice, CTC is used more for services that focus on a limited 
group of disadvantaged people, while LS systems are used for more 
universal services. Th e larger the target group, the greater the pres-
sure for a more decentralised approach, while universality is more 
likely to involve more informed and affl  uent users who want greater 
choice. Services may begin as a grant or CTC system and evolve to 
a hybrid or LS system, as has happened with the Job Network and 
child care in Australia. Once the Rubicon is crossed to a LS system 
for any service, history shows that such a change can lead to a major 
shift  in the profi le and behaviour of providers, including the in-
creased presence of FPOs.
For-profit organisations
Historically, human services have largely been provided by govern-
ment or by non-profi t organisations (NPOs) motivated primarily by 
social and altruistic objectives seeking to fi ll gaps in service systems. 
With the growth of managed markets, however, there has been in-
creasing involvement of FPOs in human services. In Australia, this 
change has been particularly evident in fi elds such as child care, 
at-home community care, and job search assistance for the disad-
vantaged unemployed.
Th ere is diversity among the FPOs involved in human services. At 
one level, there is diversity of legal structure and size, with public 
companies (that is, those traded on the stock exchange), transnation-
al companies (both Australian- and overseas-based), large private 
equity fi rms, other incorporated fi rms with single owners or multiple 
shareholders, and unincorporated sole traders all now having a pres-
ence in one or more of the various services types. All of these forms 
are present in the at-home community care sector in Australia.
More importantly, there is also diversity in motivation and objectives. 
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A core assumption of micro-economic theory and most models of the 
behaviour of the fi rm is that FPOs are organised around maximising 
profi t or the personal benefi ts of the people who own or manage the 
organisation. However, this can paint an overly simplistic picture, 
even for conventional markets. Some fi rms become involved in ac-
tivities with altruistic or broader social aims as strategies to increase 
benefi ts in the long-term. Fligstein’s sociological analysis of markets 
(2001) assumes that suppliers fundamentally want stability in the 
market as the basis for ensuring their continuing prosperity. Other 
FPOs have owners or managers who aim for some threshold of fi -
nancial surplus but are then prepared to forsake extra profi t in order 
to increase the social contribution of what they produce.
Marceau (1990) also identifi ed a group in mainstream business (in 
manufacturing) that she described as the ‘dwarves of capitalism’. 
Th ese are people who own small operations, including many 
whose core objective is to be independent rather than wealthy. 
Th e ‘dwarves of capitalism’ have a very strong presence in human 
services, and include people who have left  employment with large 
NPOs or government because of their concern about the constraints 
of the bureaucratic and increasingly commercial culture in these 
organisations. Further, in an age of outsourcing, FPOs (including 
self-employment) ‘may off er the only alternative to professionals 
seeking to continue to practice their face-to-face-support skills’ 
(Taylor & Hoggett 1994, p. 191). Some of these ‘dwarves’ represent 
a distinct and positive feature of FPOs, enabling experienced and 
capable people to provide services in ways, oft en very innovative, that 
focus on social and human objectives rather than organisational and 
commercial imperatives. While many very eff ective operators prefer 
to remain small, a number of major enterprises in human services 
that operate at national and international level began as ‘dwarves’.
Th us one needs to be cautious in generalising about FPOs that provide 
human services, as Rush (2006) showed in distinguishing between 
large corporates and small FPOs in the quality of child care each 
provides. Nor is there a straightforward association between motivation 
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and size—large FPOs may be more likely to be focused on profi tability, 
but large FPOs can also have objectives other than to maximise profi ts 
(Martin et al. 1998) and small FPOs can have owners who see them as 
cash cows and the fi rst step to a commercial empire. 
Th is chapter is not seeking to systematically assess the advantages 
and disadvantages of FPOs, and whether they do in fact achieve 
greater effi  ciency, innovation, choice, responsiveness, and better out-
comes as proponents claim (for which, see Meagher & Cortis 2009). 
Th e evidence on this is mixed and varies with each case. However, 
some situations highlight the intrinsic potential for a clash of inter-
ests between clients and profi t-maximising FPOs in human services. 
First, the board and management of public companies are required 
by law to ensure that the interests of shareholders are pre-eminent 
(Bakan 2004). Second, with regard to license-subsidy systems, basic 
micro-economic theory shows that part of any subsidy for consum-
ers is likely to be captured by suppliers in the form of a price increase 
(albeit generally less than the subsidy).8 Th is has occurred with child 
care in Australia (Hill 2007), but such price increases are avoidable 
in the absence of increased costs, and simply represent the capacity 
of a profi t-maximiser to take advantage of an increase in demand. 
For-profit organisations in managed markets for human 
services
In this section, we consider the economic and other factors that 
determine the entry and the potential market power of FPOs in 
managed markets for human services.
Incentives for entry 
FPOs can have a range of motivations, but the major incentive 
for many to enter any sector is the potential level of profi tability. 
8 Th is assumes no increase in supply, while the proportion captured by suppliers 
depends largely on the elasticities of demand and supply for the product.
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In managed markets this is substantially aff ected by government 
decisions about the design of the managed market. 
On the revenue side, a major driver is the scale of the market, which 
will be largely determined by policy and budgetary decisions about 
the universality of the service, the number of places available, and the 
size of the subsidy. FPOs will also be more present where there is the 
scope to build market share, which, in turn, depends on three design 
features of a managed market. First, there needs to be scope to attract 
more ‘customers’, as is possible under hybrid and LS systems. Second, 
licences and contracts need to be tradeable, for example through the sale 
of a licence or by a takeover. Th ird, the level of revenue in a managed 
market will be aff ected by whether providers are allowed to charge a 
co-payment if the subsidy does not meet the full cost of the service, or 
users want more or higher quality service. For some human services, 
the contribution by clients is negligible, for example, in programs for 
homeless people. But for others, such as child care and residential 
aged care, there can be substantial scope for an additional payment, 
particularly where the users/agents are more affl  uent and/or can draw 
on other sources of government support, such as family allowances or 
the aged pension. 
Two factors that impact on profi tability will vary with each case 
depending on the decisions by government about the structure of 
payments. First, higher need clients involve higher costs and risk for 
providers and usually attract higher payments. Where the payments 
are relatively high, this is an important niche for some FPOs; in oth-
er sectors, providers do not consider the extra payment justifi es the 
extra costs or risk, and ‘creaming’ occurs. Second, the way subsidies 
are paid under a LS system can aff ect the relative presence of FPOs 
via a range of possible mechanisms. For example, in child care, a 
change from tax deductions to direct payment to providers could 
have a number of possible eff ects on the relative use of NPOs and 
FPOs, and the viability of individual providers.9 
9 For example, tax deductions require parents to wait for reimbursement. Th is will 
constrain the demand for child care from some less affl  uent families, leading some 
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Barriers to entry
A number of the possible barriers to entry in conventional markets 
(Bain 1956; Carlton & Perloff  2005, pp. 73–82), such as patents or 
exclusive access to key inputs, have limited relevance in human 
services. On the other hand, the use of franchises is much more 
central to managed markets, because government is eff ectively 
issuing a franchise to some providers such that only they can access 
government funds. Indeed, for some programs, whole classes of 
providers, for example FPOs or government, are formally excluded. 
Th ese barriers are less severe in LS systems because, while the 
need to meet licensing regulations can delay entry of a provider, it 
cannot ultimately prevent entry as can occur under a CTC or hybrid 
system.
Another diff erence between managed markets in human services and 
conventional markets involves access to capital. Th e need for capital 
in any sector depends substantially on the nature of the product; 
where economies of scale exist, size matters and the inability to 
obtain investment capital for buildings or management systems 
and technology is a barrier for some organisations. With managed 
markets, the signifi cant share of revenue provided by government 
may be perceived by investors as either ‘government-guaranteed’, 
which is more likely if the program is well established; or as less secure 
because it ultimately depends on decisions by very few people in 
government rather than on decisions by many individual customers. 
Th e signifi cant involvement of NPOs in managed markets for 
human services is a further diff erence in relation to access to capital. 
In general, FPOs have an advantage in obtaining capital (Krashinsky 
1986, p. 116; Weisbrod & Schlesinger 1986, p. 146), although this 
can be off set by tax concessions available to NPOs (Gjems-Onstad 
1994). As well, the removal of direct capital assistance to NPOs in 
some sectors and the expectation that providers will incorporate 
to seek to switch to lower cost NPOs and reducing the incentive for FPOs to set up 
in some communities.
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capital costs in their overall ‘price’ has worked against the growth of 
community-based NPOs and to the advantage of FPOs. 
An important perspective on barriers to entry into any market—
but especially valuable here—comes from Demsetz (1982), who 
argued that underlying most standard barriers to entry is imperfect 
information, which can aff ect decisions by all participants, including 
producers, consumers, and providers of capital. In the absence of 
perfect information, which is more likely to occur where the product 
is a human service, the reputation of incumbent providers and the 
trust they have developed is central in giving them an advantage 
with both investors and buyers. Th e notion of ‘commercial-in-
confi dence’ can be used to further restrict the information available 
to competitors and consumers, and a means by which incumbents 
can entrench their advantage.
Finally, for any industry, entry is also partly determined by whether 
there are barriers or incentives to exit. Hence, for example, an 
organisation is less likely to enter if there is a high level of asset-
specifi city in production (that is, they cannot easily transfer the 
assets to another product or industry) or if the contract/licence to 
operate is not tradeable. While asset-specifi city is clearly important 
with physical plant (for example, specialised machinery), it can also 
be very relevant in human services in determining the extent to 
which a provider will invest in obtaining and training quality staff . 
Entry and market type
A key determinant of the presence of FPOs in a sector is the type of 
managed market, that is, whether a CTC, LS, or hybrid system is used. 
FPOs are more common under LS systems, a result of fewer barriers 
to entry, higher potential profi tability, and greater opportunity for 
FPOs to use their relative advantages (in, for example, marketing 
and capital-raising) to expand and increase market share. However, 
while a LS system may give greater scope for small operators to enter 
the market, ultimately it may also lead to a smaller number of large 
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FPOs, since a LS system allows greater scope for takeovers and amal-
gamations.10 Th us, while aimed at increasing choice for users, a LS 
system may end up reducing the choice—as indeed has happened in 
the child care sector in a number of Australian communities. 
While FPOs are likely to be more common in LS systems, they may also 
be signifi cant in those sectors using CTC and hybrid systems, where 
more of the key contracted outcomes are stated in quantifi able and ob-
servable terms. Th is is the case in the Job Network, where the number 
of jobs obtained by disadvantaged clients is a key outcome required of 
providers. 
Market power
Once an organisation is in a market, it is potentially in a position 
to exercise market power to improve its position relative to other 
providers and to limit the entry of new providers. Th e theory of 
conventional markets is that the market power of an incumbent 
derives from the extent to which there are barriers to entry. Its power 
will be a function of its size and market share and will be refl ected 
in its capacity to set price above marginal cost and limit the total 
quantity of output so as to maximise profi t.
In CTC and hybrid markets, a provider’s power over price and 
quantity will be substantially constrained given that the government 
agency off ering the contract may have the power of a monopsonist 
(that is, a single buyer) to force down price and require greater output 
and accountability from providers. Hence, competition between 
providers is likely to be focused more on quality and costs. However, 
the buyer’s power will be more limited where there are large multi-
service providers, such as nation-wide religious NPOs, which always 
have the option of transferring resources to another program and 
type of service. 
10 For example, the Productivity Commission (2002b, p. 11.5) noted that the 
introduction of a LS system in the Job Network would be ‘likely to lead to some 
consolidation in the industry’. 
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Th ere is more potential in LS markets for providers to exert power 
over price and quantity, but the nature of human services noted earlier 
means that these markets will tend to have two characteristics that 
limit this power. First, diff erentiated (or monopolistic) competition 
will be common, whereby there is a number of suppliers (many 
quite small), each with a slightly diff erent version of a core product 
(Chamberlin 1933; Robinson 1933). Second, competition between 
suppliers will tend to be centred on a local area or a segment of 
customers (Hotelling 1929). 
Th ere are two other major sources of power for suppliers in 
conventional markets, namely that a supplier has the capacity to 
shape the expectations of consumers (Galbraith 1958) and to use 
‘political’ power to shape the market by infl uencing government 
decisions on regulation and incentives. Th ese two sources of power 
are potentially even more important in managed markets for 
human services. Governments have great power to shape managed 
markets, and suppliers have ample opportunity to shape consumer 
expectations by exploiting the asymmetry of information and the 
lack of observable outputs prevalent in human services.
The effect of history, politics, and place 
Th e impact of the design of a managed market on the type of providers 
and the presence of FPOs in that market is limited by other factors 
related to history, politics, and place. In sectors where large NPOs are 
long established, inevitably there will initially be fewer opportunities 
for FPOs when funding for any service becomes contestable. Th is 
situation is likely to be exacerbated by the contracting decisions 
made by government agencies wishing to minimise early problems 
and choosing larger NPOs as major providers. Politics is important 
and every sector has its stories of lobbying government at both the 
political and bureaucratic levels, to open up opportunities and close 
off  competitors. Th us in some cases, causality may be in the opposite 
direction from that generally assumed, if the market has been shaped 
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to favour certain players, rather than the players responding to the 
market. 
Th e diff ering eff ects of history, politics and place on the profi le of pro-
viders of a service are very evident in paid care in Australia. Tables 3.1 
and 3.2 show the profi les of providers in each state in child care and 
residential aged care. While the data in the tables must be approached 
with caution,11 they suggest some signifi cant diff erences in the presence 
of FPOs between states and service types. Both nationally and in ev-
ery state and territory, FPOs are more prevalent in child care, a sector 
where government funding was not available for FPOs twenty years ago. 
Th ere are also major diff erences between jurisdictions for each service, 
with the proportion of places provided by FPOs in aged residential care 
ranging from 11.8 per cent (Tasmania) to 43.5 per cent (Victoria), and 
the proportion of FPO providers in child care ranging from 26.2 per 
cent (Northern Territory) to 82.5 per cent (Queensland). Th ere are also 
diff erences in the type of NPOs in each sector: over 30 per cent of aged 
care places nationally are provided by religious organisations, a group 
that has a negligible presence in child care. In part, these diff erences 
in the provider profi les are driven by local circumstances including the 
size, structure, and location of the target group and the history of NPOs 
in the state, and by the development strategies of major providers. But 
they also refl ect diff ering policy and practice of state and territory gov-
ernments, with for example, the licensing function in child care being 
carried out by state authorities.
Contract failure theory 
Th e theory of contract failure,12 initially developed by Henry 
Hansmann (1980; 1987; 1996), is the theory most oft en cited 
11 See notes on Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Th ere is also a diff erent base for each table, with 
Table 3.1 showing the number of places managed by each type of provider and Table 
3.2 showing the number of providers of each type.
12 Th e term ‘contract failure’ has the potential to create some confusion. Th e 
meaning of ‘contract’ here is not restricted to formal agreements as in CTC, but 
includes implicit understandings between buyers and sellers. 
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to explain the relative presence of NPOs and FPOs in any fi eld. 
Essentially, Hansmann argues that where there is asymmetry of 
information between seller and buyer because the delivery of the 
service is largely unobservable by the buyer and/or the outcomes are 
largely unmeasurable, there is a need for buyers to put great trust in 
the service provider. In such situations, Hansmann argues, NPOs 
will be more prevalent because they are more trusted, and they are 
more trusted because they face a non-distributional constraint (that 
is, their fi nancial surplus does not get distributed to shareholders). In 
brief, the argument is that where trust is required, NPOs are chosen 
because they are not ‘in it for the money’. Hansmann further argues 
that ‘Th e distinction between the for-profi t and the non-profi t form 
becomes blurred when the organisations in question are small in 
scale. Th e non-distributional constraint … has real meaning only 
when an enterprise is of suffi  cient scale to develop large earnings’ 
(1980, pp. 870–871).
In the context of this theory, how do we explain the growing (and 
in some cases dominant) presence of FPOs, especially large ones, in 
human services? Under CTC and hybrid systems, why do govern-
ment agencies choose FPOs; and under hybrid and LS systems, why 
do individual users (or their agents) choose FPOs? Let us examine 
the two major premises of Hansmann’s theory.13 
Hansmann’s fi rst major premise is that where outcomes cannot be 
easily observed or measured, a buyer’s decision is based on the trust 
they have in the seller. However, this will be less of a concern for 
those buyers who believe they can accurately assess the quality and 
outcomes of a service. Th us, a government agency may put great 
faith in ‘objective’ performance indicators, or users/agents trust their 
own judgement. Th is confi dence may or may not be justifi ed, es-
pecially if the assessment is based on only on a partial view of the 
13 Note that Hansmann’s original article (Hansmann 1980) focused largely on 
overseas aid, where donors (or ‘buyers of aid services’) have few means of checking 
on the supplier. He explicitly noted that his analysis needs further development to 
cover ‘mixed market’ situations where NPOs directly compete with FPOs. 
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service—but we are here trying to explain ‘buying decisions’, not the 
objective reality of the service. Press and Woodrow (2005, p. 282) 
note that several studies have found that parents tend to overesti-
mate the quality of child care. 
Another caveat to the fi rst premise rests on the way that many deci-
sions are made, which is not by a simultaneous balancing of all the 
variables in a single function, but a series of fi lter decisions (Man-
nion & Smith 1998, pp. 128–29). Buyers may fi rst seek to ensure a 
minimum threshold level of quality, aft er which locality, price, ef-
fi ciency, and other factors will be successively taken into account in 
the calculus of decision-making about human services to determine 
the ‘best value-for-money’. In these ways, the commercial advantage 
of large organisations and FPOs can come into play, especially in 
more capital-intensive sectors, providing there is an acceptable base 
level of quality. 
Hansmann’s second major premise is that NPOs are trusted more be-
cause of the non-distributional constraint. In practice, however, this 
needs to be qualifi ed by considerations as to how trust is gained—or 
lost. On the one hand, FPOs can gain greater trust in a number of 
ways. Th ey can employ well-qualifi ed, experienced staff  with good 
reputations. Th ey can provide a better level of service than the mini-
mum required by a contract or regulations. Th ey can undertake 
non-profi t maximising activities, such as building local social capital. 
Th ey can also use their marketing eff orts to mould the attitudes and 
expectations of buyers. On the other hand, NPOs as a group can lose 
some of their ‘trust advantage’ when some adopt corporate strategies 
and processes aimed at maximising fi nancial surplus, organisational 
growth, and the ‘market-based’ remuneration of senior employees,14 
14 Note that the non-distribution constraint does not normally apply to 
remuneration for employees in defi ning an organisation as ‘non-profi t’. However, 
this has been an issue in the United States, where some states have sought to limit 
the level of remuneration payable to NPO employees if the organisation is to retain 
its tax exemptions. 
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while reducing the conditions and rights of staff  (Horin 2007). Th is 
is associated with mission drift  (Weisbrod 2004) and institutional 
isomorphism as NPOs move away from their original purpose and 
are perceived to operate more like FPOs or their funders (Taylor & 
Hoggett 1994, p. 193; Di Maggio & Powell 1983; Smith & Lipsky 
1993). Th is ‘blurring of the boundaries’ between NPOs and FPOs 
means that one cannot predict organisational behaviour simply on 
the basis of ownership, but that subtler and more complex models 
are needed (Austin et al. 2006; Crossan et al. 2005) to identify how 
well each provider balances its social and commercial objectives in a 
market environment. 
Relational approaches in regulating entry
Given the diffi  culty of observing performance and the potential 
for opportunism where human services have been marketised, two 
major focuses of action are to ensure more rigorous government and 
self-regulation of provider behaviour, and to continually improve 
instruments to assess performance, especially for service quality and 
client outcomes. Th ese are clearly important strategies and action on 
these fronts needs to be sustained. 
However, in establishing the processes and requirements for 
contracting, licensing, and regulation, rigorous requirements 
relating to the initial entry of providers into a managed market 
are also necessary. Such requirements are not incompatible with 
contestability, and can lead to gains in both effi  ciency and service 
quality. Baumol (1982) and Baumol and colleagues (1982) point out 
that the assumption of perfect competition requiring many sellers 
is not essential for maximum effi  ciency, providing that there is at 
least one potential effi  cient entrant that can enter and exit costlessly. 
Indeed, an excess number of suppliers can lead to a loss of effi  ciency 
even if it might be argued that some users are overall better off  
because they have wider choice. Further, we can look to the theory 
of the second best (Lipsey & Lancaster 1957), which essentially holds 
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that where all of the conditions for an effi  cient market cannot be 
met, the most effi  cient outcome may be achieved by ensuring that 
one or more of the other conditions is not met. Th us Le Grand and 
Bartlett note that if ‘purchasers have inadequate information, it may 
be preferable to have providers that are not motivated by fi nancial 
considerations’ (1993, p. 34). 
Dyer (1997, cited in Horton 2005) provides an interesting lesson from 
the private sector for the operation of managed markets in human 
services. He examined diff erent approaches to contracting for the 
supply of parts for the manufacture of cars, and showed that Japanese 
manufacturers essentially used relational contracting, by which they 
chose suppliers based on common values, and then used longer-
term contracting and less detailed checking of production processes. 
By contrast, US manufacturers used competitive transactional 
contracting, which involved micro-management of the supplier’s 
processes and intermediate outputs. Even in this most tangible and 
commercial activity, the relational approach produced signifi cantly 
superior results in productivity, reliability, sales and profi t.
With the expansion of managed markets, governments in Australia 
and elsewhere have oft en moved much more towards competitive 
transactional approaches in working with external bodies. Yet 
given the nature of human services, a stronger relational approach, 
with a closer focus on the overall organisation in determining 
who can gain entry to a managed market seems more appropriate. 
A relational approach, of course, is not without its dangers—for 
example, corruption, a ‘closed shop’, or monopoly power for 
incumbents—especially where ‘public money’ is used. Accordingly, 
the case for and against a relational contracting approach, and how 
it might be operationalised, needs close examination in each case. 
Such an approach, however, can increase eff ectiveness and produce 
better outcomes, as well as saving substantial resources that would 
otherwise be applied to monitoring and enforcement.
While it is unlikely to be politically feasible to retrace the steps in 
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well-established managed markets, there are other fi elds still to 
be opened up and in which there may be signifi cant expansion in 
coming years. Th e next section takes a brief look at how one type of 
paid care service might develop without adequate regulation of the 
initial entry of providers. 
A future scenario?
Th e major program under which home-based care for older people 
and people with disabilities is currently provided in Australia is the 
Home and Community Care (HACC) program. HACC is funded by 
both national and state governments and administered by the states 
through a CTC system, with providers winning contracts for specifi c 
areas or groups of clients. While government providers are still very 
signifi cant and most non-government providers are NPOs, FPOs 
have been contracted under HACC. In addition, a range of other 
FPOs, including specialist employment agencies (Perrett 2005) and 
US corporates (Horin 2006), either work with HACC providers or 
provide home-based care outside HACC through other government 
programs or on an unsubsidised basis.
Home-based care is very likely to expand in the future, given the 
ageing of the population and policy support for this type of care 
as a much more cost-eff ective alternative to residential care (Fine 
2007, p. 102–68). If signifi cant extra money starts fl owing, it is also 
very likely that there will then be much greater interest from FPOs 
and strong pressures to introduce a LS system, which (as noted 
earlier) operates in a number of Western nations. In this event, we 
might also see the use within HACC and other government-funded 
home care programs of the standard FPO franchising models for 
home-based services. Under this model, a large corporate would 
gain a licence, and sell a ‘franchise’ to individuals operating their 
own business—that is, a variant of Jim’s Mowing or XYZ Cleaning 
Services. Th e individual would pay a signifi cant fee in return for the 
benefi ts of the corporate brand, marketing and back-offi  ce support; 
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the corporate could earn substantial revenue, while having shift ed 
much of the risk, responsibility, and costs to the individual service 
provider and the service user. Th is model is already being used for 
home care that is not funded by government.
We can presume that franchisees will be required to meet all of the 
conditions of the licence—staff  qualifi cations, work processes, and so 
on—and that the corporate franchisers will need to provide training 
and back-up. It will undoubtedly produce some very good services, 
enabling skilled and experienced people dedicated to good caring to 
operate their service independently of the bureaucratic constraints 
of larger organisations; and enabling many users and their agents 
to have a greater infl uence on the service. How it will work across 
all providers and the whole population is not so clear, especially in 
ensuring consistent quality. Issues of privity of contract, which are 
already intrinsic to CTC systems, may also arise, whereby ‘service 
recipients, who are not parties to the contract, are unable to take 
steps to enforce it even though they may be clearly aff ected by the 
contractor’s breach’ (Administrative Review Council 1998, pp. 87–
89). Th e corporate franchise approach may not be allowed initially, 
but it could gradually evolve and become accepted, just as many 
previously ‘unthinkable’ approaches for providing public services 
are now mainstream. 
Conclusion
Governments have the power to substantially shape managed 
markets. If they propose to continue—or extend—the use of managed 
markets in human services, they need to use this power strategically 
to maximise the achievement of social objectives. Two key points 
emerge from this chapter to guide to how this might be done. 
First, it is important to ensure that the initial entry of all service 
providers to these markets is closely monitored, given the distinct 
features of human services, the inherent tension between profi t 
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maximisation and service quality, and the lack of perfect information 
for service users and their agents in these markets. Further, the 
requirements set should include an assessment of the overall 
objectives, values and behaviour of the organisation, to ensure that 
all providers have a fundamental concern with the welfare of users 
rather than with maximising the personal benefi ts of the owners or 
managers of the provider organisations. Th is also implies a greater 
use of relational approaches in admitting providers to the market. 
Second, there has been a blurring of the boundaries between NPOs 
and FPOs in the provision of human services, which in part helps to 
explain the growth of FPOs in this fi eld. While it still remains more 
likely that NPOs will have strong social motivation and FPOs will 
have a strong focus on commercial objectives, the situation is now 
far more complex than a simple dichotomy in those terms. While 
there may be a need to limit the entry of certain providers in some 
situations, it is necessary to recognise that diff erent forms of FPOs 
operate, and to focus on the behaviour of providers rather than 
simply on their ownership in determining these limits.
Finally, it is important to emphasise that the most appropriate 
form of managed market and entry requirements, and the type of 
providers that should be admitted, will vary in each case, depending 
on the factors outlined in this chapter.
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